EMERGENCE DE PRINCIPES GENERAUX EN MATIERE DE DEONTOLOGIE JUDICIAIRE : ELEMENTS D’UNE THEORIE GENERALE

Abstract

Judicial ethics is a recent field of contemporary law. With its distinguishing characteristics and ties to certain specific institutions, it constitutes a distinctive field of law. Its recent establishment explains the confusion that persists between many concepts that serve as its benchmarks. A more systematic reading of the decisions rendered by the authorities responsible for its implementation, particularly the Conseil de la magistrature du Québec, can clarify concepts that are often used indiscriminately. Approached sociologically, these decisions also reveal that, alongside certain general principles explicitly stated, such as independence, impartiality and integrity (the three "I"s), other more implicit standards, such as the reference to public trust, are fundamental. Constant referral to these two reference systems reveals that judicial ethics branches out at the point where two types of rationality meet: formal rationality on the one hand (the three "I"s) and substantive rationality on the other (public trust). From this perspective, the duty of restraint constitutes a synthesized standard referred to as the "practical reason" for everyday judicial activity.