The Canadian Bar Review

DISPARAGEMENT DENOUNCED BY DAMNING DAMAGES DECISION—VALLEY TRAFFIC SYSTEMS INC V MALAK, 2024 BCCA 370

2026-05-12T18:43:18+00:00

There are several measures businesses can take to address unfair and inaccurate online reviews; however, these are often time-consuming and expensive. One option is an action for defamation, which may be particularly appropriate where the party making the defamatory statements is a business competitor hoping to undermine the targeted business by posting unflattering comments about its business practices. Such was the case in the Ansan Traffic v Valley Traffic litigation, the subject of this comment. Ultimately, the plaintiffs were awarded a total of $1.5 million for general, aggravated, and punitive damages, including $300,000 to the Ansan group of companies. Although this latter $300,000 general damages award was reportedly “the largest sum ever made to a corporation in B.C. for defamation [with] previous awards rang[ing] from $25,000—$150,000,” it may have been too low to be an effective deterrent.

BUILDING THE CASE:

2026-05-12T18:52:40+00:00

Building the Case: How Lawyers are Leading on Sustainability
By: Andrew McLaughlin & Conor Chell (eds.)
(Springer, 2025)

L’EXPERTISE COMMUNE DANS LES PROCÈS CIVILS AU QUÉBEC

2026-05-12T19:26:23+00:00

This article offers a critical analysis of the integration of joint expert opinions into civil proceedings in Quebec, in light of the 2014 reforms to the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). Presented as a key tool for reducing costs and promoting a more efficient justice system, the joint expert opinion was intended to limit the damaging effects of the adversarial system, particularly the proliferation of experts offering partisan opinions. However, ten years after the new CPC came into force, this tool remains marginal and rarely used.

Drawing on a review of legislative texts, the debates preceding the reform, and recent case law (notably the Webasto decision), the article highlights the resistance of judicial players—both lawyers and judges—to abandoning the traditional model of party control over the case file. This results in a persistent tension between the adversarial principle, a pillar of the confrontational system, and the principle of proportionality, now established as the foundation of case management.

The article concludes that the relative failure of joint expert opinions reveals a structural limitation of procedural reforms when they do not align with the dominant judicial culture. Without a genuine paradigm shift among practitioners and judges, the cultural shift necessary to ensure better access to justice also risks remaining an aborted revolution.

A MODEST AND PRINCIPLED PROPOSAL FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN ONTARIO

2026-05-12T13:51:50+00:00

Ontario’s civil justice system is in crisis. The current system does not provide for “access to justice” under any sensible definition of the term and is increasingly inaccessible even for Ontario’s middle class. Consequently, lawyers and pundits have called for a massive increase in funding to the justice system. Such funding might address perceived needs such as modernization of the system, expanded legal aid, and pro bono programs. Rather than add to calls for increased funding, we trace out reform efforts that are unlikely to require a significant uptick in governmental investment.

Specifically, we advocate for: the creation of an Ontario Civil Resolution Tribunal; reforms to the jurisdiction and operation of the Ontario Small Claims Court; reforms to the Simplified Procedure; the introduction of what American jurists have termed “rocket docket” procedures for claims over $500,000; and multiple reforms to appellate procedures. In pursuing reforms to the civil justice system, we contend that the legislature and judiciary must keep in mind three underlying principles: (1) justice is an essential public service; (2) only through transparency can the judiciary attract public confidence; and (3) the justice system must be adaptive and flexible in implementing innovative policy changes.

THE COLLATERAL FACTS BAR

2026-05-12T14:17:40+00:00

The collateral facts bar excludes evidence that contradicts a witness on collateral factual matters, in order to save time and avoid confusion of issues. A collateral matter is often said to be one that relates to the credibility of the witness. Stated in this form, the rule against proof of collateral facts is difficult to apply because many matters which relate to the credibility of a witness seem to be proper matters for independent proof. So, some commentators and courts have proposed a principled approach, according to which contradicting evidence would not be categorized as collateral or not but would be admitted or excluded based on a case-by-case assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of hearing it. But if the categorical approach is stated properly, to exclude contradicting evidence as collateral when its only function in the trial is to impeach the witness’s credibility and to admit it otherwise, a principled approach becomes unnecessary. Moreover, a principled approach to collateral facts may create the mischief the collateral facts bar is supposed to avoid. The categorical approach has all the resources it needs to distinguish between admissible and inadmissible contradicting evidence.

ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE USE OF GENERATIVE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION

2026-05-12T14:25:22+00:00

The rapid adoption of generative artificial intelligence (AI) into the legal practice has transformed the profession, significantly improving efficiency in areas such as legal research, drafting, eDiscovery, and client interactions. However, this rapid adoption has introduced ethical, regulatory, and professional challenges, including risks of AI hallucinations, breaches of client confidentiality, embedded biases, professional responsibility and liability, and concerns about the unauthorized practice of law. Each of these challenges implicates fundamental duties under the rules professional conduct, such as the duty of competence, duty of honesty and candour, and duty of confidentiality. The paper explores how these ethical duties provide a framework for analyzing AI’s impact on legal practice, and how professional regulators can ensure that technological innovation does not undermine lawyers’ accountability and the integrity of the justice system.

The paper goes further to explore the current regulatory responses to the use of generative AI in legal practice in Canada, including directives from law societies and courts emphasizing AI competency and disclosure requirements. It concludes with a set of recommendations, including the development of clear AI-specific ethical guidelines, mandatory AI training for lawyers, and safeguards against the unauthorized practice of law through AI. The paper stresses the need for a balanced approach that maximizes AI’s benefits while ensuring accountability, transparency, and professional integrity, ultimately preserving public trust and the credibility of the justice system.

WHEN (AND WHERE) IS A CRIME A CRIME?

2026-05-12T17:43:13+00:00

The principle of double criminality is often understood as a feature of extradition law, where it operates as a requirement that the crime for which an individual is sought for extradition by the requesting state must also be a crime in the requested state. However, it is a principle of broader application, used by many states in a variety of contexts where foreign conduct, alleged to be criminal, must be assessed against domestic criminal law. This paper examines this practice—in Canadian, foreign and international law—as a means of arguing that double criminality is a “principle of fundamental justice” (POFJ) for the purposes of s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It further argues that, at the very least, it is a POFJ in the specific context of extradition law and practice.

MODES PRIVÉS DE PRÉVENTION ET DE RÈGLEMENT DES DIFFÉRENDS ET L’ÉTAT

2026-05-21T18:22:24+00:00

Rules that enable conflict resolution for the state remain largely unknown and understudied. Section 75 of Quebec’s Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) constrains the state’s use of Dispute Prevention and Resolution (DPR) modes by including three criteria: government regulations on the subject, public interest and the applicable legal standards. This article analyzes concerns tied to one limit, public interest, and follows a preceding article that studied applicable legal standards and government regulations on the subject.

In practice, the notion embodies two distinct goals in the state’s conflict resolution efforts. On the one hand, it curtails some initiatives outside the courts, as it encompasses various functions related to public authority which the state cannot circumvent in resolving its dispute such as the management of public money, the administration of justice, and the enforcement of laws. On the other hand, public interest also suggests the prioritization of accessibility, efficiency and expediency of justice, goals frequently favoured by the use of DPR modes, and which argue for a state-led implementation of these modes in certain areas of law.

Using this concept, the article distinguishes between the various areas in which the state is involved in determining when the use of DPR modes should be avoided, when they should be used as a complement to the courts, and when they should be prioritized.