

PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONALISM.

When Vitoria¹ asserted that there existed "a natural right of society and communication," he was not simply condemning racial exclusiveness and national isolation; nor was he merely philosophizing on the right of man to participate in the resources of the world. He saw, as indeed history records, the constant striving through the centuries of civilized man toward unity. It was particularly natural for this sixteenth-century theologian to sound the note of the philosophy of internationalism, for the world of his day was, as Mr. Chesterton has suggested, a world of two internationalisms.²

Hegel regarded the state as the highest form of association.³ For him humanity existed as an unimportant incident. History proves the falsity of this idea. Political theory denies its worth. Ethics deplores its recognition.

In spite of climatic, geographic, racial and other differences, the nature of man demands unity and sociability. Man deeply appreciates the members of his own species, and his affection, veneration, and sympathy go to them.⁴ His gregariousness is instinctive. The communication between the present and the past in terms of man transcends the limitations of national life. While society is built up of smaller units, it has not been constructed at all times from smaller to larger units. There have been instances where a larger form of association was effected before opportunity existed for definitely rounding out the constituent units. The Roman world of antiquity, from which has developed western civilization, is an important example of the greater society preceding the formation of the lesser.⁵

The source of unity has not always been the same, but long before the diffusion of the Indo-European group of languages and before the distribution of racial types, the existence of bread culture served, as it now serves, as a great force preventing man from living as Hegel and Hobbes thought it was natural for man to live. The unity of the Roman Empire was of a political and military kind,

¹ Cf. "International Relations From a Catholic Standpoint" (Browne and Nolan, Limited, 1932). Translated from the French—edited by Stephen J. Brown, p. 28. Suarez took the same view—see "De Legibus," Book ii, ch. 19, no. 9.

² See his "Life of St. Thomas Aquinas" (London: Hodder & Stoughton, Limited, 1933), pp. 54-55, 59, 75.

³ Hegel, "Philosophie des Rechts" (1820 ed.).

⁴ Edited by F. S. Marvin, "The Unity of Western Civilization (3rd ed., Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1929)—Essay by F. S. Marvin, p. 19.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

and lasted between four and five hundred years. The unity of the mediaeval world, with a longer period of duration, was a religious and moral unity. The unity of the Western World has withstood the three major threatening disruptive forces—the dissolution of the Roman Empire, the Reformation, and the Great War.⁶ The unity of to-day, in spite of apparent paradoxical situations, is a unity based on the very complexity of modern civilization. While the instruments of unity have varied, there seems always to have been unity instead of isolation.

When European political development seemed to justify the theory enunciated by Machiavelli in 1513,⁷ there were at that very moment causes in operation, preventing the realization of the state as an absolutely self-sufficing and non-moral entity. The zeal for commerce, occasioned by the discovery of a new continent and a new route to the Indies, the common intellectual background brought about by European thought, the sympathy of co-religionists in different states for one another, and the apparent disgust with war, were factors that tended to modify the intensity of nationalism. Curiously enough, the baptism of the state as the final and perfect form of human association was accompanied by the rise of international law as an acknowledgment of the necessary existence of the wider unity. There was a change in the mediaeval idea of a world state. Then there came into being a plurality of states, but the inseparability of these was spoken of in the same breath as were the assertions of state sovereignty. For then, as now, unity was given an interpretation consistent with new political creations.

The Greek city-state, the first of the free self-governing units, never possessed the permanence or the alleged self-sufficiency of the corresponding units of our own day. For the Greeks were too busy with other matters. Their contribution to the unity of man was through the world of thought and art. Nor did the Roman world display this zeal for the sovereignty of states. Rather, with his great power of organization, the Roman sought to effect a unification of the human world composed of those countries around the Mediterranean. The mediaeval period, with this contribution of Greece and Rome behind it, strove to unify men through moral and civilized influences based on religion.⁸ Prior to the sixteenth century, the law inherited from Rome was used as an instrument to bring tribes and peoples together in common allegiance. The Christian Church effected a community of manners and morals among those in and outside the Empire. The unity of man is specially marked in the

⁶ Marvin, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-34.

⁷ The Prince.

⁸ Marvin, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-25.

West, but East and West possesses common institutions and bases of organization, all arising from a human nature that is the same, and that adjusts itself to conditions of life fundamentally the same. The basis of humanism lies in the effort to get the best out of nature.

For Hegel, history revealed the gradual unfolding of an idea of liberty.⁹ Kant looked upon the history of the human race as the realization of the hidden plan of nature to bring about a political constitution internally and externally perfect.¹⁰ The experience of our own age shows unmistakable indications of this. Certainly the era initiated by Grotius is fast coming to a close. For the period of this eminent Dutchman was one of a conception of international law based upon the relation of independent states to one another.¹¹ The tendency of man toward unity in our day is being gradually illustrated by the withdrawing of ultimate power from the state.¹² There is involved here a transfer of authority to a higher authority; this transfer should effect new formulae in jurisprudence. The natural law of the Romans and of the mediaeval period is a stumbling-block to the conception that man does not tend toward unity. Even Bodin, proud to acknowledge himself as the author of the conception of sovereignty, looked upon the state as bound by the law of nature;¹³ indeed, out of this conception international law was developed.¹⁴ True, in our own day it is conventional to ridicule the ideas of a law of nature—due to a lack of understanding as to what the law of nature is. But with the political thought of the Greeks harbouring the notion of a law of nature, with the synonymity extended by the Romans to "*jus gentium*" and "*jus naturale*," and mediaeval writers like St. Thomas Aquinas teaching that the law of nature was part of the law of God discoverable by human reason,¹⁵ it is not likely that men will long take the view that natural law should not underlie legislation and judicial law-making.

The philosophy of internationalism is not for a world to come, but arises out of the fact of contemporary world interdependence.¹⁶ The need is not for reconciliation between national interests and the

⁹ "*Philosophie des Rechts*" (1820 ed.) 61, 346-347.

¹⁰ "*Perpetual Peace by Immanuel Kant*" (1795). Translated with Introduction and Notes by M. Campbell Smith—1915, Reprint (New York: The Macmillan Company), p. 57.

¹¹ Cf. "*De Jure Belli et Pacis*" (1625).

¹² *Viz.*, "*The League of Nations*," "*The International Labour Organization*," "*The Permanent Court of International Justice*."—See "*Progress in International Organization*"—(Stanford University Press, 1932) by Manley O. Hudson.

¹³ "*De Republica*," p. 132.

¹⁴ Cf. J. L. Brierly, "*The Law of Nations*" (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1928), pp. 9-18.

¹⁵ "*Summa Theol.* II, 1, 94, 5.

¹⁶ This fact is effectively discussed by Norman Angell in his "*The Unseen Assassins*" (Harper & Brothers, 1932).

interests of humanity as much as an attempt to guarantee that the policy of nationalism shall not be likely to affect the well-being of humanity. This presupposes a change, if necessary, in the unit of allegiance. It involves a limitation of national authority—in the interests of social peace.

The modern conception of the state must in consequence undergo great modification. If ever the state possessed absolute value, it clearly must have now only a relative value. Much mischief has been done in attributing to the state the quality of personality. For the jurist there is much convenience in looking upon the state as a person; but since so much abuse has resulted from this convenience, the lawyer might now be content to experience a little discomfort. A state is made up of persons, and this renders impossible the representation of it as a person.¹⁷ Gierke regarded the group as being more than the total of its constituents, and with this thought thus expressed, there need be no disagreement.¹⁸ Political philosophy, however, must never lose sight of the fact that the unity possessed by the group is distinguishable from the unity of a person. The result of this identification of the state as a person has resulted in the idealistic interpretation given the entire social system. The state, *per se*, has no independent intrinsic value. Otherwise, absolutism is justified. Because of the fallacies that have resulted, we must cease from using the analogy of the state as a person;¹⁹ and definitely decide upon an appreciation of the nature of social unity before trying to extend the nature of the state; for the nature of the state is not understandable if the prior claim of social unity is not recognized.

The philosophy of internationalism is in direct conflict with the Hegelian conception of the state.²⁰ There is the denial of the state as a living person or as a collective person. There is also the denial of the Hegelian view that the welfare of the state is its own highest law.²¹ But neither will Kant's conception satisfy; for his federation of the nations, formed in the interests of peace, postulates in terms of present needs a real federation, but a federation of independent self-sufficing nations.²²

There can be no question of the need for a change in our idea of the nature of the state. Viewed historically, most theories of the state have possessed a pragmatic character. They come into being

¹⁷ Cf. R. M. MacIver, "The Modern State" (Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1926), p. 452.

¹⁸ Gierke, "Political Theories of the Middle Ages", IV.

¹⁹ For a contrary view see Brown, *op. cit.*, 31-34.

²⁰ "Philosophie des Rechts, 257, 258.

²¹ See Hobhouse, "Metaphysical Theory of the State".

²² Smith, "Perpetual Peace"; (Kant), *op. cit.*, pp. 128-9.

to satisfy a situation, and they undergo modification insofar as they cease to comply with the needs of man.²³ But Bodin, Hobbes and Hegel constructed a system of states at a time when the whole theory of the state was based on the assumption that it was the final form. Bodin, while arguing that the state should be the sole source of laws but not bound by them, acknowledged the relevancy of the mediaeval doctrine of the law of nature.²⁴ His theory of sovereignty was a deduction from the political facts of his day. Since the rise of national states there has been a reluctance to formulate a new theory based upon existing conditions. The preference has been to adapt the old theory to new conditions. Sovereignty, thanks largely to the lawyers, but more to the philosophers, was regarded as an indispensable characteristic of the state. Those who used this conception of sovereignty failed to allow Bodin's own mitigations of the theory. The lawyer, anxious to reduce what Hegel calls the "indwelling unity" to definite known proportions, will now have to change his thinking, even though it may result in a partial loss of the sacrosanct character that time has lent to the conception of the state. This, the philosophy of internationalism seeks to do. Sovereignty as an indispensable element of state structure must go.²⁵ As a fact, it has never been, and certainly no modern state can honestly give claim to its possession. The realism of the moment is disturbed at Jellinek's view that the theory of auto-limitation would bring about the realization of the ends for which the state exists, for no will bound only by itself is likely to accept this self-imposed condition.²⁶ If states will not surrender their claims to sovereignty, if political scientists will not abandon the theory, a struggle will ensue; anarchy will take the place of order, and the disorder will not be ended except by force. There will be no occasion for the application of law and agencies of peace in place of anarchy. From the debris of sovereign states there will emerge a single one superior in strength over all.²⁷

The doctrine of the fundamental rights of states indicated by such claims as the right of self-preservation, independence, equality, respect, and intercourse, is merely the old doctrine of the natural rights of man transferred to states.²⁸ The difficulty arising from this trans-

²³ Cf. Harold J. Laski, "A Grammar of Politics" (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 2nd ed., 1931), p. 21.

²⁴ See footnotes 10 and 11, *supra*.

²⁵ Cf. Leon Duguit, "Traité de Droit Constitutionnel". See also "Studies in Law and Politics," by Harold J. Laski (Yale University Press, 1932), pp. 237-275; and by the same author, "The Foundations of Sovereignty". See article by F. B. Sayre in "American Journal of International Law" 12: 705-43, Oct. 1918.

²⁶ Laski, "Studies", *ibid.*, 261.

²⁷ This view was expressed by Professor Arnold Toynbee in a recent address.

²⁸ Brierly, *op. cit.*, 35.

fer has been that for many, the state has come to be regarded as existing as an end. The individual is prior in importance. The state exists for the individual. The philosophy of internationalism looks upon the individual as entitled to expect from the state an environment in which the individual can realize the best of himself. There is disagreement, however, with Hobbes and Bentham that the rights of the individual are those recognized by the state.²⁹ This will not do, for rights are conditions of living without which the individual cannot be at his best. These rights are inherent in man's nature and prior to the state. The state loses its effectiveness and purpose when it does not guarantee the enjoyment of these rights. Speaking of the state as a person, and attributing to it rights and duties, should have been only a convenient way of saying that individuals constituting the state have rights and duties. The individual has not been enabled fully to realize himself when, for instance, the declaration of war lies so readily at the will of the state. If the state is to exist as an agency for the benefit of the individual, it must no longer continue to function with unrestricted will. Inadequate is the jurisprudence which separates the idea of law from the idea of justice; adequate, that which urges the interpretation of the needs of mankind, not in terms of the well-being of states, but rather in terms of the well-being of men.³⁰ What Professor Carlton Hayes has termed integral nationalism, we may regard as occasioning the subordination in which the individual in the modern state finds himself. This kind of nationalism looks upon the nation, not as a means to humanity, but as an end in itself. This integral nationalism has perfected a uniformity within the state itself, thus subordinating personal taste and liberty; and this it does "in the national interest."³¹ Kant and Rousseau, unlike Hobbes, assisted in the framing of a philosophy of internationalism, denying that the state could achieve unity separable from the people.³² There can be no denying that in a political organization the main factor is not the collectivity but the individuals constituting the collectivity. The State is nothing apart from the individuals who go to make it up. The State apart from individuals cannot commit a crime. The State has no end save the ends of the citizens. The State exists to assure to each citizen the necessary conditions for the development of personality. This implies a whole series of inalienable rights which

²⁹ Hobbes, "Leviathan", chaps. XIV, XV. Bentham, "Fragment on Government", particularly chaps. I, IV, V; "Anarchical Fallacies", in "Works", vol. II. See also Laski, "Grammar of Politics", *ibid.*, 90.

³⁰ Cf. Laski, "Studies", *op. cit.* 259.

³¹ Carlton J. H. Hayes, "The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism" (New York: Richard H. Smith, Inc.—1931), pp. 165-6.

³² Smith, "Perpetual Peace" (Kant), *op. cit.*, pp. 128-129.

belong to every human being. This theory of inalienable rights involves, I suppose, the "rationes aeternae" of St. Augustine and the "immutability of essences" and the value of human personality as conceived by St. Thomas. As Professor Maurice DeWulf has written, "these inalienable rights harmonize with the stoic elements of Roman law."³³

Aristotle regarded the state as the highest form of human association, preceded in order of time only by the household and the village, yet more important than both. The state arises from the union of villages into an association seemingly possessing the characteristics of self-sufficiency. It is the ultimate and the perfect association. It exists for the sake of the complete life; through it the individual is able to realize the end of his existence. Only in the state can the complete life be lived. Consequently, man is by nature a social and political animal.³⁴ With this St. Thomas Aquinas agreed, but he thought that Aristotle did not go far enough. A province which included a number of city states possesses a higher degree of self-sufficiency.³⁵ In introducing the province, or, as it is sometimes called, the kingdom (*regnum*), St. Thomas introduced a new element in political philosophy. The philosophy of internationalism quarrels neither with Aristotle nor with the great mind which sought to reconcile Aristotle with Christianity. Contemporary society is vastly different from that of the time of Aristotle and St. Thomas. If one could formerly speak of the state or of the province in terms of self-sufficiency, it is now no longer possible to do so; and man, admittedly a social and political animal, can live the complete life only in the larger society.

For Bosanquet, "the state as the operative criticism of all institutions is necessarily force."³⁶ Both Sybel and Treitschke agreed that the state was not formed by pacific competition.³⁷ Hobbes looked upon the natural state of man as one of war in which he saw a struggle for honour and for preferment. The political-mindedness and the social nature of man as Aristotle and St. Thomas viewed it, never came within the vision of Hobbes, who thought men hated and feared the association of their kind.³⁸

Internationalism is not necessarily dependent on either of these last-mentioned theories of Aristotle or Hobbes. If, in the light of

³³ See his article "Society of Nations in the Thirteenth Century", *International Journal of Ethics*, 29: 210-29 (Jan. 1919). The last part of this paragraph is entirely from Professor DeWulf's article.

³⁴ Aristotle, "The Politics I" (Jowett's "The Politics of Aristotle"—Oxford, 1885—is the text which I use throughout).

³⁵ "De Regimine Principum", I, 1.

³⁶ "Philosophical Theory of the State, ch. VI.

³⁷ See MacIver, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-2.

³⁸ "Leviathan", ch. XIII.

contemporary conditions, the view of Hobbes is the more acceptable one, internationalism is particularly urgent. While there is much truth in the theory that man does not form a society purely through the agency of pacific competition, it greatly exaggerates the strength of force. Whereas force can take the place of unity, neither development nor unity is possible where it reigns. But man has developed. He has realized a high degree of unity, and his nature, that of the social and political being, leads him to channels of greater opportunity for development. As Kant has pointed out, nature gave to man none of the perfect equipment for self-preservation and defence given to other animals;³⁹ to man was given reason and freedom of will, through which faculties nature has intended that man should achieve for himself a development of his inherent powers. This he has constantly striven to do. In seeking perpetual peace, by which is meant not merely the absence of war, man is attempting to realize the highest good. The realization of this highest good, Kant regarded as the ethical and political "summum bonum," wherein reside the purposes of morals and of politics.⁴⁰ Toward this union history reveals man's untiring effort.

It has already been suggested that if man is the pugnacious creature some theorists hold him to be, there is all the more reason for man seeking the broader society.⁴¹ For if man were naturally reasonable, always social in his instincts, always able to act as his own judge in his own cause, always fully tolerant of his neighbour's point of view, there would then be no fear from international anarchy. And by the same reasoning it would be unnecessary to speak of the state as necessary to man's nature. Some of our contemporaries translate the ideas of Hobbes and his school by observing that society is so organized in the economic sense, that the principle of survival of the fittest is necessarily the order of the day, and that the only way to stop insufficiency is by elimination of the unfit. The internationalist, regarding man as a social and political animal, generally speaking, asserts that insufficiency is due to dislocation and lack of co-ordination, and feels assured that co-operation can attend to the evils of maldistribution. The fundamental thought of our own day is that the Hegelian "equation between social status and governmental capacity" is wholly inapplicable to the present social structure. For the same reason the classical theory of the state appears wholly inadequate to the needs of the moment, and the philosophy of

³⁹ Smith, "Perpetual Peace" (Kant), *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁴⁰ Smith, *ibid.*, 60.

⁴¹ Leonard Woolf, "The Intelligent Man's Way to Prevent War" (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd.—1933), particularly the contribution by Sir Norman Angell, pp. 484-487.

Duguit⁴² in France, Kelsen⁴³ in Vienna, Krabbe⁴⁴ in Holland, Laski⁴⁵ in England, and Pound⁴⁶ in the United States, approaches more the aim to extend the political philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas to contemporary conditions.

Internationalism, therefore, looks upon society as the ultimate. The state, like other smaller societies, is merely the expression of society in general.⁴⁷

The difficulty of our thinking is due to the fact that we have failed to make a necessary distinction. As Professor MacIver has pointed out, "if man is a political animal, it is only because he is a social animal."⁴⁸ This thought can be further pursued. The logic of political order seems to demand a unity of system throughout the world. This being so, the theory of absolutely independent states is a mere obstacle to the acknowledgment of this truth, which does not deny group peace, but emphasizes the common bond between all men and humanity. If men must be part of a political system, the same reasoning demands the inclusion of man in the larger political and social system, "the unbounded rule of law."⁴⁹ Nor is there anything unnatural about this. Man seems, as a rule, to have displayed a loyalty to the group, but this loyalty has never gone unaccompanied by a respect for the human nature in man of other groups. Professor Carlton Hayes has indicated that the member of a primitive tribe has always shown an interest in, and sometimes an admiration for, other tribes or other "nations"; and in this simple society there seems to have been no necessary antithesis between nationalism and internationalism.⁵⁰

The function of government, according to both Aristotle and St. Thomas, lies in the establishment, in the maintenance and in the promotion of right living among subjects. To effect these purposes, unity, which is peace, is the most effective instrument.⁵¹ The end of political action is certainly not the Machiavellian notion that the

⁴² See footnote 21.

⁴³ Hans Kelsen, "Sozialismus und Staat," *Einleitung*.

⁴⁴ Hugo Krabbe, "The Modern Idea of the State".

⁴⁵ *Supra*.

⁴⁶ Roscoe Pound, "American Law Review", January to February, 1910. See also by the same author, "Interpretations of Legal History" (Cambridge University Press, 1930); and "Introduction to the Philosophy of Law" (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1922); "The Spirit of the Common Law" (Boston: Marshall Jones Company, 1921); "Law and Morals" (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1926); also numerous articles in the more important Law Reviews.

⁴⁷ Cf. Angell, "Unseen Assassins", *op. cit.*, 97.

⁴⁸ MacIver, *op. cit.*, 447.

⁴⁹ MacIver, *ibid.*, 484.

⁵⁰ Hayes, "Historical Evolution of Nationalism", *op. cit.*, 2.

⁵¹ Cf. William Archibald Dunning, "Political Theories—Ancient and Mediaeval" (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930), vol. I, p. 202.

chief purpose of civil legislation is to enhance the power of the state.⁵² Government, in a world that knows only a world market, and is as a consequence, a world of interdependent units, can attain its loftiest height only through world government.⁵³ Since men have the same human nature, and their natural equality gives them title in equal measure to the fruits of the earth, right living is possible only through the kind of society within the contemplation of a philosophy of internationalism.

Hobbes defined peace as "the absence of war."⁵⁴ This is an incomplete and false definition. More correctly, peace has been defined by St. Augustine as the "tranquility in order,"⁵⁵ a definition which St. Thomas develops by pointing out that peace is "indirectly the product of justice in the sense that justice removes all obstacles to it."⁵⁶ The Roman ideal was peace through system and order, grounded upon a pattern of justice. No system without an ideal of justice can experience peace; and so a legal system is no less necessary in inter-state relations than in relations between citizens. We can agree with Dante, "between any two princes, of whom the one is in no ways subject to the other, disputes may arise either by their own fault, or by that of their subjects. Judgment must, therefore, be given between them. And since neither can have cognizance of the other, because neither is subject to the other, there must be a third of ampler jurisdiction, to control both by the ambit of his power."⁵⁷

Civilization and peace are not opposed terms.⁵⁸ The barbarian looked upon war as his main occupation; all his gods were warlike. His arms were sent with him to his grave because his whole life was a continuous battle. He lived by violence. His only sense of justice was expressed through his power.⁵⁹ But the civilized man seeks order. Man's nature does not impel him to degenerate from perfection. In spite of his many decadences, true human progress has been from barbarian to civilization. The philosophy of internation-

⁵² Cf. Suarez, "Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Legislatore" (edition published at Naples, 1872) Lib. III, cap. xii, s. 2.

⁵³ For a similar discussion of this syllogism, see Sir Arthur Salter, K.C.B., "Recovery, the Second Effort" (New York: The Century Co., 1932).

⁵⁴ Leviathan, chap. XX.

⁵⁵ "De Civitate Dei", XIX, C. 13.

⁵⁶ "Summa", IIa, IIae, q. XXIX, Art. 3, ad. 3.

⁵⁷ "De Monarchia, I," 10. See also "De Monarchia, II," 9—"When two nations quarrel they are bound to try in every possible way to arrange the quarrel by means of discussion: it is only when this is hopeless that they may declare war."

⁵⁸ Cf. "Woolf", Essay by Harold J. Laski, *op. cit.*, p. 499.

⁵⁹ Cf. Robertson, "History of Charles V". (Works, 1813, vol. V), Sec. I, vii. See "Woolf," Essay by Sir Norman Angell, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-21.

alism seeks the fulfilment of man's natural impulse towards this ascendancy.

As noted, some philosophers and jurists look upon the state as a person. Bluntschli went so far as to attribute to the state the quality of sex.⁶⁰ Curiously enough, a good many of those who look upon the state as a person deny that the state is limited by laws of justice, decency and morality. Hobbes, disagreeing with Grotius and his school, went further even than Machiavelli in his reverence for political authority, in regarding the state as the source and criterion of all right. Only as a matter of practice was politics divorced from religion and morals with Machiavelli. But, for Hobbes, even in philosophical theory, religion and morals did not touch politics.⁶¹ The individual has been taught to discipline his will. It is not regarded as manly to parade one's superior strength or position, and yet society, made up of individuals, has developed another tendency. Nations permit themselves lusts and orgies that the individual would never claim, as if the nation had a right, to provoke disorder, threatening the ruin of others—merely because it will to do so.

Internationalism has as its thesis that right shall always be supreme. Indeed, only of comparatively recent date has it been assumed that the state was above justice and the law. The ancients did not deny the relation between politics and morals. For Plato, morals always came first. Aristotle, while he gave political science its first real objectivity, looked upon ethics as integral to politics.⁶² Machiavelli, it is true, wrote that "A prince, and most of all a new prince, cannot observe all those rules of conduct in respect of which men are accounted good, being frequently obliged, in order to preserve his Princedom, to act in opposition to good faith, charity, humanity and religion. He must, therefore, keep his mind ready to shift as the winds and tides of Fortune turn, and . . . he ought not to quit good courses if he can help it, but should know how to follow every course if he must."⁶³ Hume does not seem to have gone as far as the author of "The Prince," but he, too, thought that nations should not be subjected to the same system of morals.⁶⁴ In the Middle Ages, right meant a particular aspect of universal justice, but not a different right in the case of nations than that in the case of individuals.⁶⁵ The great difficulty of contemporary international law is that justice and objective truth do not dictate national policy.

⁶⁰ In his eyes it was a male. *Theory of the State*, Bk. I, ch. I.

⁶¹ Dunning, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 301.

⁶² Dunning, *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 51, 298.

⁶³ "The Prince", ch. XVIII.

⁶⁴ "Treatise", III, Part II, Sec. IX.

⁶⁵ Cf. Laski, "Grammar of Politics", *op. cit.*, p. 45. See Angell, "Unseen Assassins", *op. cit.*, p. 13.

A state is at liberty to reject or accept. There is no moral obligation binding treaties. Responsibility for wrong is often excused through the medium of legal fiction. The relations between states do not enter into the category of moral obligation. The philosophy of internationalism makes no distinction between morality as applied to individuals and as applied to states. It postulates an objectivity of legal principles embodying what is conceived to be just and right, and imposes obligations upon states, leaving no alternative but acceptance. International law assumes in this philosophy a supremacy over municipal law. States become provinces of a "*civitas maxima*," and force in the sense of police power becomes the handmaid of all over each.⁶⁶ International law, then, will cease to be what Hegel thought it should be, merely an external municipal law. If Austin was right in suggesting that international law was merely positive morality, then it ceases to be such in the philosophy of internationalism.⁶⁷ If this point of view is not to be the accepted one, then there is an end to all justice and freedom in society. As Professor Laski has pointed out, "no organization is entitled to our loyalty merely because it is a bond, a source of reference, in a legal hierarchy; its title depends upon the ethical adequacy which pervades its exercise of its power."⁶⁸ This important incident in the philosophy of internationalism is not the result of a failure to appreciate how difficult an art politics really is. The suggestion is, however, that politics and morality, working hand in hand, do away with the need of politics as an art. As Kant indicated, in the event of conflict between the two sciences, "the moralist can cut asunder the knot which politics is unable to untie."⁶⁹

The philosophy of internationalism is in direct issue with the nationalism which has been to the fore in this century. This nationalism, described by Professor Carlton Hayes as "a condition of mind among members of a nationality, perhaps already possessed of a national state, a condition of mind in which loyalty to the idea or to the fact of one's national state is superior to all other loyalties, and of which pride in one's nationality and belief, in its intrinsic excel-

⁶⁶ The legitimate interests of the state will thus be protected. See George Malcolm Stratton, "Social Psychology of International Conduct" (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1929), p. 339. "The life of governments is like that of man. The latter has a right to kill in case of natural defence: the former have a right to wage war for their own preservation"—Montesquieu, "De L'Eprit Des Lois, X, Ch. II. See Woolf, "Essay by Harold J. Laski", *op. cit.*, p. 540.

⁶⁷ Laski, "Studies," *op. cit.*, 268-9.

⁶⁸ "Nationalism and The Future of Civilization"—Conway Memorial Lecture—(London: Watts & Co., 1932), p. 55.

⁶⁹ Smith, "Perpetual Peace" (Kant), *op. cit.*, Appendix I, p. 183.

lence and in its 'mission' are integral parts,"⁷⁰ must share absorption by the new theory just as we have shown must be the case of our conception of the state, of sovereignty, and of the exemption of the state from law and justice. It is not easy to describe nationality or the kind of nationalism Professor Hayes speaks of. It may safely be argued, however, that purity of race, the possession of a common language and a common geographical position are not necessary constituents of nationality or of nationalism. Nationality would seem rather to have a cultural foundation, and as such, nationality has certainly a tribal origin. Given nationalities, however, are not at all perennial in nature. Integral nationalism, as Professor Carlton Hayes calls it, is extremely artificial, and its life depends upon the strength of propaganda.⁷¹ Its astigmatic character⁷² illustrates its danger, and whereas a philosophy of internationalism would not disturb nationality, it would get rid of this particular kind of nationalism.

Plato, convinced that unity was of fundamental importance in any state, hoped to achieve this unity through uniformity, by means of the elimination of the family and the abolition of private property. Aristotle, not less sensible of the need for unity in the state, sought to effect it through an ordered regulation of the many elements constituting the state.⁷³ For the true unity does not involve an obliteration of all the diversities in individuals. Harmony does not cease to be harmony because of the difference in musical tones. Likewise internationalism will not affect the diversities seen in individuals and in nations, but through this diversity will come the realization of its thesis. Kant's ideal of a cosmopolitan constitution is not what is necessarily intended, for the value both of the family and the nation must not be disturbed by a vague, colourless, uninteresting cosmopolitanism. Internationalism is at variance with Herodotus, who asserted: "I believe in one Blood, one Speech, one Cult, one congruous Way of Living."⁷⁴ An intellectual, moral, and religious unity is what is sought. Mere uniformity is not unity; variety is wealth.

A great internationalist and scholar, Professor Alfred Zimmern, would have internationalism through nationalism, not the nationalism of our day, given the status of a religion without the foundation,⁷⁵ for instance, of ancient stoicism. An ordered nationalism

⁷⁰ "Essay on Nationalism" (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), p. 6.

⁷¹ Hayes, "Essays", *ibid.*, 20-21.

⁷² Cf. Angell, "Unseen Assassins", *op. cit.*, pp. 125-126.

⁷³ Dunning, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 62-63.

⁷⁴ "Herodotus", viii, 144.

⁷⁵ Cf. Woolf, "Essay by Sir Norman Angell", *op. cit.*, 27.

is desirable. Professor Zimmern is right in regarding nationality as a safeguard against "the insidious onslaughts of materialistic cosmopolitanism."⁷⁶ Jingoism is the substitute for an ordered nationalism. Internationalism has been, and for many still is, an extravagance. When the individual is overshadowed, when a people become cosmopolitan to the extent of losing a veritable national heritage, the vice of internationalism soon illustrates itself, for again, with Professor Zimmern, "the road to internationalism lies through nationalism, not through levelling men down to a grey, indistinct cosmopolitanism, but by appealing to the best elements in the corporate inheritance of each nation."⁷⁷ Any other view does not allow for the great achievements of nationality. Architecture, literature, art, music, and other manifestations of civilization are in large measure due to nationality, and these treasures must not be dissipated.⁷⁸ The philosophy of internationalism, preserving this strength of individuality, seeks no more than to destroy the tendency of national exclusiveness, of uniformity, of docility of the masses, of war and its kindred evils: jingoism and false national intolerance.

"A state," says Socrates, "rises out of the needs of mankind: no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants."⁷⁹ This, then, is the reason for mutual economic assistance in a day of economic interdependence. Commerce and industry no longer are dependent upon the expansion of political frontiers. Military power becomes socially and economically futile, and does not affect the prosperity of the people exercising it. Wealth can no longer be seized by one nation, and war cannot achieve a victory. The doctrine of another day was based on the assumption that a nation's prosperity depended upon territorial expansion and the imposition of political force.⁸⁰

If war was ever the occasion of a combat over ideals, it has long since ceased to be. Moral questions find dissentients within all nations, and they cross political frontiers. The altercations of contemporary man go on between citizens in the same state, and call for a redirection of human disagreement.⁸¹

Hegel thought that peace would make man effeminate and degenerate amidst luxury.⁸² Count Moltke thought that "without war the

⁷⁶ "Nationality and Government" (New York: Robert M. McBride and Company, 1918), pp. 53-54.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

⁷⁸ Cf. Hayes, "Essays", *op. cit.*, 251; see also Hayes, "Hist. Ev. of Mod. Nat.", *op. cit.*, 303. But see Marvin, Essay by Rev. Dr. A. J. Carlyle, *op. cit.*, 160-161.

⁷⁹ Cf. "Republic", II, 369.

⁸⁰ Cf. Norman Angell, "The Great Illusion" (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933), p. 59-60. See William Archer, "The Great Analysis" (London: Williams, Norgate, Ltd., 1931), pp. 54-55.

⁸¹ Cf. Angell, *ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

⁸² "Phil. d. Rechts" (Werke, vol. VIII). Part III, sec. 324 and appendix.

world would sink in materialism."⁸³ But it must not be forgotten that vice may just as well be the child of war, and all the virtues of military life can easily be taught and acquired in other pursuits. Herbert Spencer⁸⁴ has perhaps properly suggested that the warlike type would lend itself to replacement by the industrial type. An internationalism, which does not supplant the loyalty of the citizen to his state, or efface national tradition, but that ever agrees with Tocqueville that all men have a "patrie intellectuelle," will not, because of the universal reign of law and the wide acceptance of a law of nature, interfere with man's effort at improvement and betterment.

PAUL MARTIN.

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⁸³ Smith, "Perp. Peace" (Kant), *op. cit.*, 73.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 76.
