REVIEWS AND NOTICES

A Textbook of the English Confict of Laws. By CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF, L.L.M.(Lond.), L.L.D.(Berl.). Of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, Ltd. 1945. Pp.xlvi, 455. (35s. net)

In a book the size of an ordinary novel, Dr. Schmitthoff has given a very complete account of a difficult subject, English Private International Law. When it is remembered that this branch of our jurisprudence is replete with theoretical differences and that too often case authority is obscure and incomplete, an exposition of it both compact and adequate is a work of great merit. Moreover the attention given to history and theory is well balanced with that accorded to the effect of cases and statutes.

At the beginning the author faces the difficult problem of the juridical nature of Private International Law. After pointing out that for most purposes of private law the world is a collection of mutually exclusive territorial legal units each with its own sovereign system of law, he puts the really fundamental question of our Conflict of Laws: "Why do the municipal courts pay regard to foreign law at all? Why is not the maxim 'whoso goes to Rome must do as those in Rome do' extended to all suitors in the municipal courts, and municipal law applied to their disputes to the exclusion of all other laws? Is not the application of foreign law (which may sometimes be required by the rules of the municipal conflict of laws) out of harmony with the principle of territorial sovereignty?" The author finds his answer to this in the "vested right" theory of Professors Beale and Dicey, which he accepts as the true explanation of the nature of Private International Law. Beyond doubt he is in distinguished company in so doing, and yet this theory has been very effectively criticized by Professor W. W. Cook in his "Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws", and it is rejected as well by Dr. Cheshire, particularly in the latest edition of his textbook.

Professor Beale has stated the "vested right" theory as follows: "A right having been created by the appropriate law, the recognition of its existence should follow everywhere. Thus an act valid where done cannot be called in question anywhere." Hence it is contended that acts and events at the moment of their occurrence are subject to only one territorial legal system which alone can ascribe legal significance to them and which accordingly operates to vest rights and obligations in the individuals concerned. It is admitted that the operation of laws is territorial in scope but it is said that rights, once vested by the appropriate local law, can then "walk abroad" with their owners and must necessarily be accorded recognition and effect by other territorial legal systems. Thus, Dr. Schmitthoff speaks of "The distinction between foreign law, which is not entitled to enforcement in the English jurisdiction, and rights created by that law, which generally are protected by the English courts". On this view, the rules of Private International Law are concerned with assigning facts when they occur to their appropriate territorial legal systems. This necessarily presumes that there are universal and uniform tests of appropriateness valid for all legal systems whereby this task of allocation can be implemented and the limits to the operation of the

various territorial laws marked out. Such principles would need to take one of two forms: they might be part of a genuine international law binding on all countries, or they might be embodied in universally valid principles of legal philosophy and logic the consistency of which is compelling enough to control the content of the various national rules of the Conflict of Laws. The latter view, which is really a natural law conception, is the position usually adopted by modern exponents of the "vested right". For instance Dr. Schmitthoff speaks at one point of juristic principles of general application by which certain statutory conflictual rules are to be evaluated.

In opposition to this there is what has been called the "local rights" theory powerfully advocated by Professor Cook, which Dr. Schmitthoff does not discuss. It is briefly to the effect that any separation of law and legal right such as that postulated by the "vested right" theory is false. A legal right is held to be completely the creature of a particular legal system and thus the right as such has no legal existence outside of the territory where the law which creates and maintains it is operative. So it is asserted that the only rights which exist and are enforceable in England are rights created by English law. However, when confronted with facts having important foreign elements, English law as it has developed frequently accords special significance to those foreign elements when to do so is consistent with English notions of policy, convenience and justice in the particular matter concerned. Thus if a set of facts before an English court has predominantly French elements, English Private International Law will usually operate so as to create an English right closely equivalent to that which French law would confer *in France* on the same facts. This equivalent right might differ greatly from the right which would be enjoyed by the claimant if the same facts were connected only with England. This does not mean however that French rights cross the Channel with their owners and must then necessarily be recognized in England. Thus the "local rights" theorists draw very different conclusions from territorial sovereignty than do those who follow the "vested right". This is no place for further discussion of the issue; suffice it to say that the "local rights" theory does seem much the more realistic and flexible of the two.

From what has been said, it is not surprising to find that the author, in his treatment of particular topics, has great difficulty in explaining some of the doctrines of English Private International Law on the footing of his "vested right" theory. He quite correctly observes that no wrong committed abroad is actionable as a tort in England unless all the requirements of the English law of tort have been met, just as if the act or omission in issue had occurred in England. If A insults B in Cape Town so that B has an action by the Roman-Dutch Law there prevailing, nevertheless if A and B come to England B could not recover in an English court because English local law knows no such tort. It is impossible to reconcile this with the "vested right" theory, but nevertheless Dr. Schmitthoff explains it as a qualification of that theory based on public policy, which he considers to be in this respect at least an "ultimate reservation" procedural in character. "The English courts cannot very well give damages for a wrong committed abroad" he says "if they withhold damages for the same wrong if committed at home. English courts are willing to pay attention to foreign vested rights but they will not give them preferential treatment as compared with that conceded to English rights." This is indeed a sweeping exception and it is reasonable to doubt a theory which requires such exceptions to be made. Such a principle

of public policy cannot be accepted. In the first place it is based on a very questionable distinction between right and remedy, on the footing of which it is said to touch procedure only and not substance. However, public policy, as usually conceived in this regard, defines certain fundamentals of our legal system and institutions, and forbids the adoption by English Private International Law of any foreign principles of law which would work results repugnant to these basic concepts. This can hardly be dismissed as merely procedural. Further, any such principle as this, namely that claimants relying on foreign facts are to be confined in England to such remedies as the local law would give for rights arising on the same facts if domestic to England, would certainly stifle our Private International Law. The present English rules regarding foreign torts are indeed anomalous and narrow. Clearly, they should not be dignified by justification in terms of public policy.

By contrast, in the field of contract, a very liberal doctrine prevails, but it is also one that is just as difficult to reconcile with the "vested right" theory as is that concerning foreign torts. If the parties to a contract have expressly agreed that it is to be submitted to a particular country's law, then English courts will give effect to their intention and apply the principles of the law thus selected as the proper law to govern its validity and effect. Thus, as in the *Vita Foods* case,[1] if A in Newfoundland agrees with B in New York that a contract between them for the carriage of goods from Newfoundland to New York is to be governed by English law, then English law does become the proper law of the contract. The "vested right" theory however would require that such an agreement should be submitted to the law of the country where it was made, or at least the country with which in fact it was most intimately connected on objective considerations. In the case just mentioned this might be Newfoundland or New York or the country of the ship's flag, but it would certainly not be England. A "vested right" theorist cannot allow the parties to an agreement a free choice of the territorial law that is to govern it. Dr. Schmitthoff does not advert to this difficulty at all. However, in spite of what seems to be error in basic conceptions, the author on the whole expounds the particular rules in these branches of the subject fully and accurately.

Proceeding now to the law of property, the learned author here also gives a clear exposition of the detailed rules. So far as transactions *inter vivos* are concerned the poverty of precedent and conflict of theory are particularly vexing, but Dr. Schmitthoff makes his way through the conflictual rules of immovables, movables and choses in action with great skill. The chief problem here is to determine when to use the contractual test of the proper law and when the proprietary test of the *lex situs*. Following Dean Falconbridge and Professor Dicey the author adopts the distinction between contract and conveyance which alone seems to provide the key to order and consistency in this field. Personal rights are assigned to the proper law of the contract while the strictly proprietary rights affected by the same transaction are referred to the *lex situs* of the thing over which property is asserted, whether it is land or tangible movables.

This same distinction is observed with regard to choses in action and the legal rules whereby situs can be attributed to such intangible things for

[1] *Vita Food Products, Incorporated* v. *Unus Shipping Company, Ltd. (in liquidation)*, [1939] A.C. 277.

this purpose are clearly enunciated. If a good reason can be found for considering an intangible thing to be situate in a foreign country, then this same reason suggests that the legal principles of that country should be considered in defining English rights in respect of it. As Dr. Schmitthoff points out, "The connection of a particular right with a locality is usually fairly obvious. Thus the situs of the goodwill of a business is the place where the business is situate, that of shares is the place where the register of transfers is kept, and that of a judgment debt where the judgment was recorded." In the case of simple contract debts the attribution of situs is admittedly difficult and assignments of debts pose special problems, but on the whole it would seem that the author's approach to the questions of property in intangibles is a wise one.

Finally, so far as the general characteristics of this textbook are concerned, its relative compactness has already been mentioned. The author cannot of course in some 450 pages analyze cases, statutes and doctrines in as much detail as do Dr. Cheshire and the editor of Dicey in works about twice this size. However Dr. Schmitthoff does give a remarkably full and accurate treatment to all branches of Private International Law, due in considerable degree to a lucid and concise style and accurate terminology. It need not be emphasized what admirable qualities these are for a legal writer. Further the learned author uses some comparative law very effectively, certain Continental and American rules of Private International Law being explained at several points to throw into clear focus by contrast the corresponding English principles. Whether or not one agrees with Dr. Schmitthoff on controversial points of general theory, his textbook can be recommended without reservation as an able and provocative survey of this difficult but fascinating branch of our law.

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Eternal Lawyer: A Legal Biography of Cicero. By ROBERT N. WILKIN. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, Limited. 1947. Pp. xvi, 264. ($3.00)

This book, by a judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, constitutes an interesting and useful addition to the long list of studies of the life and character of Cicero. The facets of Cicero's genius were so many and his historical importance is so great that it is not surprising that he has been the subject of many biographies and shorter biographical studies by historians and by editors and students of his works. Various biographers have written from various points of view. Judge Wilkin has chosen to make Cicero as a lawyer his central theme. His book is valuable in itself and is also a timely reminder of a man who, despite some human frailties, was a great and good man.

Cicero was supreme as an advocate, especially as counsel for the defence in criminal cases. His almost invariable success in this field depended of course upon the perfect adaptability of his mode of appeal to the tribunal he had to address, but the same test might properly be applied to any advocate in any age. His achievements as advocate would in the ordinary course of events have been the most transitory of his claims to fame, but the fact

that he wrote and revised many of his speeches for publication has the result that his speeches are also an important part of his contribution to Latin literature.

He played an important role, at certain times the leading role, in the public life of Rome at a critical period in history. Although in some respects he was ill-fitted for success in the struggle of politicians for power, his want of success was to some extent caused by a lofty moral sense that was lacking in less scrupulous rivals. He himself was unduly boastful of his having saved Rome from destruction by Catiline, but we may set against this the fact that he sacrificed his life in his unsuccessful attempt to save the Republic from overthrow by Antony. Judge Wilkin, in his account of Cicero as a lawyer, rightly devotes considerable space to political events, and explains why a constitutional lawyer with high ideals was destined to fail in his efforts to find a remedy for the political turbulence and social disorders of republican Rome.

The evidentiary value of Cicero for the history of the middle of the first century before Christ remains supreme. It is by reason of his letters and speeches and other writings that this period is perhaps better known to us than any succeeding period of the world's history until we come, say, to the reign of Queen Anne in England or the reign of Louis XIV in France. Incidentally his letters, especially those written to Atticus, are so self-revealing that Cicero himself is more intimately known to us than any of his contemporaries.

In Latin literature his period is specifically known as the Age of Cicero, and his works constitute a body of writing massive in bulk, and in quality so highly regarded that he, so to speak, set the style in prose. For a long time there were some distinguished writers who were frankly Ciceronians notwithstanding intervening changes in the vocabulary and style of Latin writing. One part of his literary activity was perhaps most important of all in its enduring value. Towards the end of his life, during a period of his political eclipse, he wrote a series of philosophical works, mostly adapted or translated from Greek originals, in which he employed his incomparable bilingual knowledge to equip the Latin language with a vocabulary which made it an efficient instrument for the expression of abstract thought and thus fitted it to become the common language of the learned world for many centuries.

If in the year 1957 the world is itself in a fit state to celebrate a great anniversary, it might well consider the celebration of the 2000th anniversary of Cicero's death, which in 43 B.C. marked the end of an important phase in the history of civilization.

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Conserving Marriage and the Family. By ERNEST R. GROVES, Professor of Sociology, University of North Carolina. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd. Pp. ii, 138. ($1.75)

Unwittingly and often unwillingly the average legal practitioner, whether specialist or not, is called upon to act in the role of domestic counsellor.

Despite the legal rights and duties of his client upon which he is asked to advise, the lawyer feels himself impelled by perhaps a deeper wisdom to attempt the apparently impossible task of rescuing such possibilities of happiness as yet remain in the marital "smash-up" presented to his view. But unless the lawyer possesses the wisdom of Solomon, he himself needs help in performing this difficult role. That assistance is now available to him in compact form in "Conserving Marriage and the Family", which, although written in terms of the basic legal principles governing divorce in the United States, nevertheless answers some of the psychological problems resulting from marital difficulties that confront the lawyer in Canada.

"So you're going to get a divorce?" asks Author Groves of those perplexed and doubtful wives and husbands who require to think their marital problems through and make intelligent decisions. "The unwise divorce" declares the author "is irrevocable." The law provides a remedy for the reckless passion-driven marriages. But the law unfortunately has no remedy for the reckless passion-driven divorce. Once the decree absolute is pronounced and one of the divorced pair remarries, reconciliation is forever impossible.

"Conserving Marriage and the Family" is directed primarily to wives, because divorces are usually granted to women. The author proceeds to analyze the following common reasons given by persons seeking a divorce.

(1) If the petitioning wife is asked why she wants a divorce her usual answer is, "I'm unhappily married!" "But" askes the author "were you happy before marriage or were you discontented and frustrated and sought relief in marriage? Be honest with yourself. Will you be happier divorced? No person can expect with such a background of discontent, no matter what its source, to find marriage different from other aspects of life unless first there is a change of personality. If you have been asking marriage to perform an impossible miracle, the chances are that a divorce will only make still clearer the fact that you must fundamentally change. It is natural for us whenever we find ourselves dissatisfied to try to find some cause outside ourselves as an explanation. Thus the adolescent finds the parent at fault; the man in the office his boss; and the discontented wife, her husband."

"Marriage" declares the author "cannot be an excursion into a lifelong unadulterated pleasure. If you are unhappy because you are asking an endless sojourn in paradise and being denied it, I am telling you the truth, whether you like it or not, when I assert that divorce can never be a solution for such childish expectations."

(2) But what if the petitioning spouse charges: "My mate is unfaithful"! This, admits the author, is the strongest possible motive for divorce, but such a motive does not alter the consequences of breaking up the family. Once the divorce has been obtained and emotion has lessened the husband and wife have regretted the divorce. "Something more than mere suspicion of unfaithfulness is required", says Professor Groves. "Frequently the woman's pride is so hurt at even the suggestion of her husband's disloyalty that she tries and convicts him without his knowledge and her own imagination acts as chief witness."

The author distinguishes "acute" from "chronic" unfaithfulness. "Acute unfaithfulness" is similar, in its significance as an aspect of personality, to murder committed in the spirit of passion. "Even if you are sure that your husband has been unfaithful" he advises "the husband guilty of merely acute unfaithfulness, resulting perhaps from a state of intoxication, might

justly be forgiven. Perhaps he can never fully forgive himself. The question you have to answer is can you help him recover? If the children are involved, what are their rights in the matter?"

(3) The most prevalent reason for seeking a divorce, according to Professor Groves, is, "We are always quarrelling", and the chief cause of quarrelling he attributes to chronic irritability. The individual by voice or manner stirs up opposition from other people. He is sensitive to such a degree that it almost seems as if he were looking for trouble. "In such a condition divorce will only remove the opportunity for quarrelling with the spouse. The habit will persist and will find some other outlet. The only solution is to decrease the cause and the proneness for quarrelling. Before you divorce your husband you should try finding a way to rid him of his irritability or help him keep it under control."

(4) Another common allegation made to the domestic counsellor by a wife seeking divorce is, "He isn't the man I married!" To the wife to whom the true character of her husband, as revealed after marriage, is disappointing, the author observes, "Some wives, and less often husbands, refuse to move beyond courtship and romance. To them the wedding-day is the climax of their lives. You need to be certain that your impulse to get a divorce and your feeling that your spouse has been a disappointment is not really this unwillingness to accept a readjustment to life that properly follows marriage. For your own advantage you should honestly examine yourself before you convict your spouse of having proven not the person you thought you were marrying. It would be foolish for you also not to consider what your life will be after you are divorced. You do not want to jump out of the frying pan into the fire and this is just what some discontented wives have done. Can you support yourself after you are divorced? Finally, does your husband understand how you feel?"

(5) Next in order of complaints made to the domestic counsellor by married persons seeking divorce, Professor Groves discusses the husband's allegation; "My wife is frigid", or the wife's counter-charge, "We are badly adjusted sexually". Here, after a full analysis, the author concludes with the advice: "seek out a [medical] specialist who does have understanding of the difficulties husbands and wives face in their marital adjustment. Give the wife a chance to prove herself a good sex partner."

(6) Mother-in-law and father-in-law interference is another frequent reason for seeking divorce, especially by husbands. Says the husband to the counsellor: "Her mother is always making trouble". "If", comments the author, "the parent is free at all hours to visit the household of her newly-married child, there is almost as much opportunity to create jealousy and irritation as when all are under the same roof." The most difficult of all "in-law" complications is that which comes from the husband and wife having radically unlike religious faiths. We rightly discourage the marriage of a Catholic and a Protestant or a Jew and a Gentile. There is nothing that is so likely to impel the parent to try to control the life of a married child as a religious conviction. To married persons in these unhappy circumstances Professor Groves asks: "Are you unduly sensitive? Are you asking not that the mother refrain from interfering with your home, but that she entirely separate herself from her child? Finally may there not be a better way out of your predicament than divorce? Outrival your competitor for example?"

After an analysis of such causes of marital disagreement as "fights about money", "fights about children" and such unrecognized motives to discord

as "father or mother fixation", "failure to grow up" and "matrimonial monotony", Professor Groves concludes: "If you decide to get a divorce after thinking through your situation as honestly as you can, looking at the future as well as the present, it is very important that you find the right sort of lawyer. There are some lawyers whose professional ethics are questionable and who do almost nothing else but help people become divorced. It is for your own interest to avoid this latter type of lawyer and find one whose reputation is good and who will see you safely through what at best may not be a pleasant experience."

"This is my eleventh-hour suggestion" says the author. "If you are determined to get a divorce; first [by separation from your spouse] test yourself with a trial divorce. Live long enough as if your were divorced to find out how you will like having this break made legal. The experience may prevent your making a great mistake."

Although "Conserving Marriage and the Family" is only a small book, it is the kind of book that should be carefully "chewed and digested" by all unhappily married people who would avoid an "unwise divorce"; and perhaps recommended for their perusal by their legal advisers.

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English Constitutional History. By the late THOMAS P. TASWELL-LANGMEAD. Tenth edition by T. F. T. PLUCKNETT. London: Sweet & Maxwell, Limited. Toronto: The Carswell Company, Limited. Pp. xxviii, 833. (30s. net)

It is indeed a pleasure to welcome a new edition of a tried and trusted work on the constitutional history of England. Canadians have always been indebted to Great Britain for the works of high literary merit and sound scholarship she has sent us in the past, and British text-books have been in wide and general use in diverse faculties of our universities. Unfortunately, the intervention of the war years and the subsequent years of paper shortages have seriously restricted the supply reaching this country; hence it is now reassuring to note the appearance of new editions or reprints of books of such scholarly repute as this one. In these times of clashing ideologies and power politics, it is important for the continuation of our way of life that works showing the development and historical origins of our system of government should enjoy a fully adequate circulation. Books such as Taswell-Langmead, and countless others, are one of Britain's most vital exports and we may be thankful that the existence of a free press still permits their publication and distribution.

The first edition of Taswell-Langmead appeared in 1875 and the last previous edition eighteen years ago. During its long history this work has become a classic in the field of constitutional history. Its solid worth is attested to not only by its longevity but by the number of distinguished scholars who have consented to edit the various editions that have appeared since the death of Taswell-Langmead. These editors have been five in number, and the publishers are to be congratulated on having secured for their latest edition the services of Theodore F. T. Plucknett, who is

Professor of Legal History in the University of London and a legal historian of renown.

The new edition is virtually the same size as its immediate predecessor. The print, however, is much closer in the new edition and this fact, together with an increase of some fifty pages, is proof that much new writing has been added to the previous edition. The paper is not of the best, but this is to be explained no doubt by the paper shortage and economy standards prevailing in Great Britain. In addition to considerable changes in the text, the index has been considerably revised, enlarged and generally improved and a very useful Table of Statutes, chronologically arranged, has been added.

Professor Plucknett has dealt drastically with certain portions of the text where he felt it to be necessary, and he has merged the tributaries of his own scholarship and learning with the common stream of historical research which had been successively augmented by earlier editions. Following the example set by the editor of the ninth edition, no attempt is made to distinguish typographically between the work of the author and the contributions of his successive editors. The contributions of all combine to form one harmonious whole and "the undergraduate reader", as Professor Plucknett remarks in his Preface, "is only dimly aware of either author or editor". Some might question the advisibility of adding new material in this piecemeal fashion to an old work, which might be thought to be out of step with current research on the subject. The answer to this objection must lie, of course, in the calibre of the original writing, in the soundness and accuracy of the material contained in the first edition. If the work is basically sound in its initial form, the subsequent use of the material in new editions, combined with the results of more recent research, is entirely justified. Taswell-Langmead's Constitutional History has obviously proved itself worthy of such treatment. The original author laid the foundations well and the result today is a sound and reliable work on English constitutional history, brought up to date in every respect.

The editor has endeavoured at all times to carry on the original plan of the author — namely, to use general political history as a stepping stone to constitutional history. The story of the English constitution is followed chronologically so far as possible with constant references to political history, and the evolution of the laws of the constitution is shown against a background of social and economic changes and development.

Where modern historical scholarship calls for a revision of opinion as expressed in earlier editions, Professor Plucknett has made the necessary changes. For instance, there has been some rewriting of the chapter on Magna Carta. The editor is bound, of course, to give the modern interpretation of Magna Carta as opposed to the grossly-exaggerated idea of its importance enunciated continuously from the time of Coke until the nineteenth century. Instead of the legendary charter which tradition has produced, he shows us that in the real Charter there was nothing theoretical or abstract or revolutionary, "but merely a practical assertion of rights as between the crown and the subject, and as a natural corollary under a system of feudal tenures, between mesme lords and their sub-vassals".

The latter portion of the book likewise contains substantial additions and changes, especially on such important matters as the offices of state,

the cabinet, the growth of parties and the rise of the premiership. A new chapter has been added on the modern Parliament and the final chapter of the previous edition entitled, "Progress of the Constitution Since the Revolution", has been replaced by four new chapters: "The Rise of the Modern Political System", "Civil Liberties", "Local Government and Social Services" and "British Rule Beyond the Seas".

As we read today of strife, rebellion and violent political changes in so many parts of the world, the peaceful development of the British constitution and the orderly evolution of Dominion Status within the Commonwealth, traced and explained in the new edition of Taswell-Langmead, seem like the calm waters of a sheltered harbour contrasted with the roaring of an angry sea outside. But the rule of law in the Commonwealth is being attacked from within as well as from without and one wonders sometimes how long our orderly way of life will endure.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

The mention of a book in the following list does not preclude a detailed review in a later issue.

Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal. By LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD. New York: New York University Press. London: Oxford University Press. 1947. Pp. xxxi, 614. ($5.50)

Industrial Regulation in Australia. By ORWELL DE R. FOENANDER. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. 1947. Pp. xvi, 232. (17s. 6d.)

Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies: Essays in Honor of Roscoe Pound. Edited with an Introduction by PAUL SAYRE. New York: Oxford University Press. 1947. Pp. ix, 807. ($12.50)

Marriage is on Trial. By JUDGE JOHN A. SBARBARO in collaboration with ELLEN SALTONSTALL. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited. 1947. Pp. xiv, 128. ($2.00)

The Record of American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Relations. Edited by RUHL J. BARTLETT. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1947. Pp. xx, 731, viii. ($6.00)

Theobald on the Law of Wills. Tenth edition by J. H. C. MORRIS. London: Stevens & Sons Limited. 1947. Pp. lxxiv, 639.

Voting Procedures in International Political Organizations. By WELLINGTON KOO, Jr. New York: Columbia University Press. 1947. Pp. vii, 349. ($4.00)